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OF THE GATT PROCUREMENT CODE
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1. INTRODUCTION

The issue of binding the U.S. states under trade agreements has become a nettlesome problem in the current
negotiations on government procurement in the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 1 In these
negotiations, the European Community ("EC") is pressing the
United States to obligate the states to abide by the obligations
of the 1979 GATT Agreement on Government Procurement
("Procurement Code" or "Code"). 2
The Procurement Code obligates the signatories to adopt
open and competitive procedures in the preparation, solicitation, review, and award of government contracts covered by
the Code for the purchase of goods and related services. The
Code, however, does not cover subcentral governments such as
the states.' The EC claims that seventy percent of government
purchases in the United States occur at the state and local

"Associate, Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld, Washington D.C. The author
would like to express sincere appreciation to Benjamin Erulkar and
Matthew Nicely for their assistance in researching and drafting.
1 Opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 44
U.N.T.S. 187. The Uruguay Round takes its name from the country where
the trade ministers from several GATT signatory countries met in 1986 to
launch the Round. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial
Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Sept.
20, 1986), reprintedin 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1623 (1986). A ministerial meeting held in Brussels in December of 1990 to bring the Round to a
close broke down when the European Community failed to offer reform of its
agricultural subsidy program sufficient to satisfy agricultural exporting
nations. Since then, the negotiators have continued to meet in an attempt
to move the talks forward. See, e.g., GATT Leader Sets An Ultimatum in
Uruguay Round, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Sept. 23, 1991.
' The Procurement Code is reprinted in General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp. at
33 (1980) [hereinafter Procurement Code with article numbers].
' The exclusion of subcentral governments is implicit in Procurement
Code art. 1(2), which requires parties to "inform" regional and local
governments of the objectives, principles, and rules of the Code.
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government level.4 The EC contends that subcentral government purchases therefore should be within the scope of the
Code. The EC is unwilling to grant the concessions sought
from it by the United States unless the United States agrees
to adequate Code coverage for the states. 5
As a matter of constitutional law, the United States could
bind the states without their consent! However, because of
the politics of federalism, the United States refuses to force
the states to conform to the Code without their consent.
Instead, the United States has offered to seek, and in fact has
begun seeking, voluntary commitments from the states to bind
their procurement practices under the Code. Currently, it
remains uncertain whether the United States will muster
sufficient voluntary commitments to satisfy the EC.
A recent case from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has effectively closed off an avenue by which
the United States could have deflected some of the external
pressure placed on it to bind the states under the Code. In
Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,' in which the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the summer of 1991, the
Third Circuit upheld a Pennsylvania 'Buy America" law that
required state and local agencies to award public works
contracts only to those contractors who provide products that
do not contain foreign steel.'
Had the court decided the opposite and struck down
Pennsylvania's discriminatory procurement law, which is
clearly inconsistent with the open and competitive procurement rules that would have applied to Pennsylvania if it were
bound by the Procurement Code, U.S. trade negotiators might
have been able to tell the EC to be patient and let the courts

4 See SERVICES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 1991:
PROBLEMS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE US 57 (1991).
5 See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
7 916 P.2d 903 (3d. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, _
U.S.
, 111 S.Ct. 2814
(1991).
8 The court held that the Buy America preference did not violate the
commerce clause, because the state was acting as a market participant, and
did not interfere with the federal government's foreign affairs power. The
court also rejected constitutional attacks based on vagueness and equal
protection theories. 916 F.2d at 909-13.
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invalidate discriminatory provisions that affect the ability of
EC producers to compete for state government contracts. Such
an outcome might have helped relieve the pressure on the
United States to bind the states. However, the Trojan opinion
stands as a strong indication that courts will not strike down
discriminatory state procurement laws. Consequently, the
U.S. negotiators must confront the issue of binding the states,
with or without their consent.
This article surveys the changes that would be required in
state procurement laws to bring them into compliance with the
GATT Procurement Code. The prospect of such change is
daunting. Virtually every state has some provision in its laws
that would violate the Code. The inconsistencies include not
only express preferences such as the "Buy America" provision
at issue in the Trojan case, but also the "Buy In-State"
provisions found in the laws of a majority of states. In
addition to these expressly discriminatory provisions, many
states' laws fail in some significant respect to follow the basic
open and competitive procedures that the Code prescribes.
This article begins with an overview of the Code and the
state of the Uruguay Round of negotiations regarding the
Code. It then briefly surveys the constitutional law issues in
binding the states and the "dormant" commerce clause and
foreign affairs powers issues in Trojan and its predecessors.
Following these sections, the article analyzes the potential
inconsistencies between the Code and state laws. The article
concludes that binding the states under the Code will require
revisions in the procurement laws of nearly every state.
2. THE PROCUREMENT CODE NEGOTIATIONS
2.1. Code Obligations
The GATT Procurement Code was negotiated as part of the
Tokyo Round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations, which
concluded in 1979? Currently, the Code has twelve signato-

' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 26th Supp. (1980). The Code came into effect on
Jan. 1, 1981. Procurement Code art. IX(3). As mandated under Procurement Code art. IX(6)(B), a further round of negotiations on improving the
Code began three years after the Code came into effect, or 1984. These
negotiations led to a protocol amending the agreement which came into
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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ries, including among others the United States and the EC.10
The Code applies to purchases (or leases, rentals, or hirepurchases, with or without an option to buy) valued at over
130,000 Special Drawing Rights" of goods and services
incidental to the supply of the goods' 2 undertaken by the
government entities that the signatory governments have
agreed to bind under the Code, as listed in Annex I of the
Code.'"
The goals of the Code include ensuring transparency in the
procurement practices of covered entities and ensuring that
"laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding
government procurement [are not] prepared, adopted, or
applied to foreign or domestic producers and to foreign or
domestic suppliers so as to afford protection to domestic
products or suppliers and [do] not discriminate among foreign
products or suppliers." 4 To accomplish these goals, the Code
sets forth requirements relating to (1) the use of open or
selective tendering, (2) the qualification of suppliers, (3) the
preparation of specifications, (4) the notice of proposed
purchase and tender documentation, (5) time limits, (6) the
submission of tenders, (7) the receipt and opening of tenders
and awarding of contracts, and (8) the provision of information

effect on January 14, 1988. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE GATT AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 1 (1989) [hereinafter PRACTICAL GUIDE]. For a description of the
changes implemented in the 1988 protocol, see International Trade
Administration, United States Department of Commerce, Results of 19841986 GATT Government Procurement Renegotiations (1989) [hereinafter
Commerce DepartmentPamphlet].
10 The signatories are: Austria, Canada, European Economic Community
(which bound procurement by member country governments), Finland, Hong
Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United States. See PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 9 at 1. Korea has applied
to join the Code. See South Korea Seeks to Join GATT Procurement Code,
Would Open $500 Million in Contracts, 7 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 999 (July
4, 1990).
" Procurement Code art. I(1)(b). For 1992, the U.S. government valued
130,000 SDRs at $176,000. See 56 Fed.Reg. 66117 (Dec. 20, 1991).
1 To qualify under the Code, the value of such incidental services must
be less than the value of the goods to which they are incidental. Procurement Code art. I(1)(a).
13 Procurement Code art. I(1)(c). This Annex is reproduced in PRACTICAL
GUIDE, supra note 9, at 209.
14 Procurement Code Preamble.
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and hearing of complaints. In addition, the Code provides a
dispute settlement mechanism whereby signatories may
challenge the procurement practices of other signatories.
2.2. Code Negotiations
The current round of Code negotiations aims at broadening
the Code's coverage and strengthening its obligations.
Proposals under consideration include: extending Code
coverage to service contracts (including public works contracts); expanding the list of entities bound under the Code;
lowering the value threshold for Code coverage, and improving
Code procedures, for example, by requiring signatories to
provide a bid protest mechanism for challenging bidding
procedures.15
The Code negotiations have made some progress on
addressing these issues; however, they have remained largely
stalled since December of 1990 because of a deadlock between
the United States and the EC over Code coverage for power
utility and telecommunications industries, urban transport
projects, and subcentral government procurement.
2.2.1. Utilities and Transportation
One of the United States's goals in the Code negotiations
is to gain access for U.S. companies to procurement by EC
telecommunications and power utility companies, the majority
of which are government owned. The United States cited
statistics showing that in the telecommunications field, 99.5
percent of all tenders in Germany go to German firms and 100

15 For a draft of the U.S. proposal, see Special Report, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Nov. 2, 1990 at 2. For a draft of the EC proposal, see INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Sept. 21, 1990 at 10. For a discussion of the negotiations between
the United States and the EC, see Dullforce, GATT Breakdown Hits Public
ProcurementPact, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990.

With respect to proposals to require a bid protest procedure, it should
be noted that the Code arguably already includes a bid protest requirement.
See Procurement Code art. VI(1)(6). Apparently, however, some signatories
see the need to strengthen that requirement. See generally, 54 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) at 599 (Oct. 22, 1990) (discussing Code dispute resolution and
U.S. bid protest proposal).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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percent of the tenders in France go to French firms."6 The
EC, in turn, wanted the United States to bind transportation
projects under the Code.'
In August 1990, the EC proposed to open its public
procurement market in the telecommunications, transportation, power and water utilities to foreign bidders if its trading
partners would respond with equal treatment." The United
States, however, did not view this proposal favorably because
U.S. telecommunications, water, and power utilities generally
are privately owned companies, while in the EC many are
government entities. The United States deemed it inappropriate to bind private companies under the Procurement Code.' 9
2.2.2. Subcentral Governments
Another contentious issue was whether state and local
governments should be governed by the Code. The EC argued
that discriminatory procurement practices by the U.S. states,
including "Buy America" and "Buy In-State" laws, effectively
exclude EC firms from $200 billion in procurement awards
each year.20 The EC insisted that the states be brought
within the Code, and linked progress on the issue of EC

" See U.S. Officials Deny EC Allegations That U.S. Is Blocking
ProcurementTalks, 54 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) at 888 (Dec. 24, 1990).
17 See id. at 889.
" European Community Proposes Wider Access for Foreign Bidders in
Public Procurement, 7 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) at 1227 (Aug. 8, 1990)
[hereinafter EC Proposal].
19 The European Community particularly wanted to bind AT&T, GTE,
and the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) under the Code. The
EC claimed that European suppliers of telecommunications equipment are
effectively excluded from procurement by AT&T. Furthermore, the EC
contended that AT&T and Northern Telecom provide 90% of the equipment
to the RBOCs. Dullforce, GATT Breakdown Hits PublicProcurement Pact,
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990.
As one U.S. official explained, "[Wle think it would be somewhat turning
logic on its head for the GATT to resolve to take action which results in
greater government involvement in the affairs of the private sector. We do
not think the way to deal with government influence in the private sector
is by giving government even greater influence there." EC Proposal,supra
note 18, at 1227.
20 See EC Set to RetaliateAgainst U.S. if States Refuse to Abide by GAYT
Procurement Code, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) at 323 (Feb. 27, 1991).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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telecommunications and public utilities procurement policies

to the issue of binding the U.S. states under the Code.2
2.2.3. Attempts to Break the Impasse
In an attempt to move the talks forward, the negotiators in
late 1990 decided to separate the major issues.22 Regarding
privately owned power, water and telecommunications
utilities, the United States proposed that governments make
"self denial" commitments, agreeing not to enact any regulations authorizing or encouraging such entities to discriminate
against foreign suppliers.23
With regard to binding subcentral governments, U.S.
negotiators proposed a voluntary compliance plan for the
states, under which Code signatories would attempt to obtain
the broadest possible coverage of subcentral government
entities. 4 Under this proposal, within eighteen months after
the conclusion of the agreement, the signatories would submit
a list detailing the extent to which subcentral government
procurement laws had been brought into conformity with the
Code. Signatories would have the right not to apply the
agreement to other signatories if the coverage was not

" See EC Proposal, supra note 18. See also EC Links Agreement on
Procurement to Including State, Local Governments, 7 Intl Trade Rep.
(BNA) at 857 (June 13, 1990).
2' Special Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 2, 1990 at 3.

Negotiations

were split into three categories: category A addressed federal government
procurement (including federal transportation projects); category B
addressed subcentral government bodies; and category C addressed entities
which depend on special and exclusive rights obtained from the government
and which are closely regulated and therefore under "potential government
influence." Id.
" Id. The U.S. proposal on "natural monopolies" broke that category
down into two groups: 1) companies that have significant government equity
investment or ownership and that are subject to exclusive or special rights
granted by governments would be included in the Code; but 2) companies
satisfying only one of those two criteria would not be included in the Code.
For these entities, the governments would make "self-denial" commitments,
agreeing not to enact any regulations authorizing or encouraging discrimination. This scheme would have placed within the Code a few U.S.
government-owned utilities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, but
would not have included private companies such as AT&T and the RBOCs.
Id. 24
Id.
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adequate.25 The EC indicated some willingness to accept this
approach, although it was concerned about the number of
states that the United States could bring into conformity with
the Code.2"
Although these proposals helped move the talks forward,
agreement was not reached at the Brussels ministerial
meeting. Since then, the United States and EC have remained
at odds on the issue of Code coverage for telecommunications,
water, and power utilities, urban transit projects, and the
states."'
Since the Brussels ministerial meeting, the United States
has made a concerted effort to convince the states to voluntarily offer to bind a significant amount of their agencies' procurement under the Code. In response to a request by U.S. Trade
Representative Carla Hills, the National Governors' Association ("NGA") passed a resolution in August 1991 urging its
members to pledge to keep their states' non-discriminatory
procurement practices open by placing them under the
coverage of the GATT Procurement Code. The NGA had also
previously passed a resolution calling for the elimination of
existing discriminatory purchasing practices.2"
However, the NGA resolution is nonbinding. In order to
implement it, state legislatures would have to amend state
statutes to bring them into conformity with GATT procedures.
For instance, state legislatures would have to eliminate any
"Buy America" or "Buy In-State" statutory provisions. The
willingness of the states to take these steps remains unclear. 9

25

Id.

26
27

Id.

28

kd

See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 23, 1991 at 7.
The National Association of Manufacturers has also issued a

statement in support of binding the states under the Code. INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, July 5, 1991 at 5.
29 Wisconsin has publicly indicatedits readiness to bring its procurement
practices into Code compliance. See Letter from Tommy G. Thompson,
Governor, State of Wisconsin to U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, July
22, 1991, on file with Office of Public Affairs, United States Trade
Representative, Executive Office of the President, 600 17th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20506. See also INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 23, 1991 at 7.
Other states also may have privately informed U.S. negotiators of their
willingness to conform to Code procedures.
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Thus, more than a year after the Brussels meeting, the
United States continues to face the dilenma of bringing state
procurement practices into conformity with the Code.30
Without voluntary commitments from a substantial number of
states, it is uncertain whether the EC and United States will
be able to break their deadlock in the Procurement Code
negotiations.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND BINDING THE STATES

3.1. The Authority to Bind the States
United States trade agreements generally, and GATT
multilateral trade agreements in particular, are negotiated as
non-self-executing executive agreements."' Thus, while they
are not treaties requiring the advice and consent of the Senate,
they require implementation either by Congressional enactment or executive branch
regulation pursuant to preexisting
32
authority.
statutory
The widely accepted view is that an executive agreement
pre-authorized or approved after the fact by Congress has the
same force in domestic U.S. law as a treaty.3 3 Therefore, like

"0A draft agreement on Procurement Code revisions tabled on December
20, 1991 by the chairman of the Procurement Code negotiating group
indicated that "sub-central governments" would be bound by the Code to the
extent specified in Annex 2 to the agreement. Draft Agreement on
Government Procurement, Article I (Dec. 20, 1991), available at the offices
of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law.
However, Annex 2 was a blank schedule.
31

JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 143-55 (2d ed.

1986).
" Id at 123. Since 1974, the President has conducted GATT negotiations pursuant to "fast track" negotiating authority, by which Congress
grants the President authority to enter into negotiations for trade
agreements and adopts procedures for passing legislation to implement such
agreements without any amendments. 19 U.S.C. § 2191 (1988). Sections
1102 and 1103 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), imposed limits on the exercise of fast
track authority. The authority initially was scheduled to expire as of June
1, 1991, but was extended for another two years when Congress failed to
pass a resolution of disapproval on May 31, 1991.
,1 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 175 (1975

ed.).
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treaties, such agreements prevail over inconsistent state law
and earlier inconsistent federal law. 4
Thus, as an executive agreement authorized and implemented by Congress, the GATT Procurement Code and its
amendments would prevail over inconsistent state law, if the
United States chose to bind the states."5 The United States,
however, has not chosen to enter into an agreement that would
pre-empt state law without the consent of the states. The
reason for its reluctance to do so may well be that Congress,
for political reasons, prefers not to preempt the states in an
area so closely connected with state governmental operations
as the purchase of supplies and equipment.3 6

4

Id. Of course, under the Constitution, a treaty is the supreme law of
the land that prevails over any inconsistent state law, as well as earlier
inconsistent federal statutes. U.S. CONST. art. VI. See also Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (treaties as supreme law of the land).
In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), the Supreme Court found
that a self-executing executive agreement overrode a New York state law.
The Court wrote, '[in respect of all international negotiations and compacts
[including executive agreements], and in respect of our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York
does not exist." Id. at 331.
"' In this regard, Professor Jackson writes:
[Ilt seems reasonably clear that if the nations that are parties to
the Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code had provided in
the code that it would apply also to governmental purchases by
government subdivisions like states in the United States, the U.S.
federal government would have had the power to require the states
to follow the international agreement.
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 200 (1984). Arguably,
the Constitution might provide some limits on the federal government's
authority to modify state law via international agreements. See HENKIN,
supra note 33, at 245-46 (discussing limitations on treaty power based on
federal structure). However, the argument that the Tenth Amendment
would limit federal government intrusion into state government procurement practices is not likely to succeed, in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tfransit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
36 Jackson writes, "[T]here were at least some perceptions during the
[Tokyo Round] negotiations that some members of Congress might have
opposed approval of an international government procurement code designed
to apply to state government purchases." JACKSON ET AL., supra note 35, at
200.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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3.2. No Help from the Dormant Commerce Clause or Foreign
Affairs Powers
With, on the one side, demands from the EC to bind the
states as a prerequisite to significant EC concessions in the
Code negotiations, and, on the other side, serious concern that
Congress simply would not accept an agreement binding the
states without their consent, U.S. negotiators find themselves
squeezed into a tight spot. Unfortunately, they will find no
help from the courts.
37
In Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held
that the commerce clause and the federal government's foreign
affairs powers under the Constitution did not invalidate a
Pennsylvania "Buy America" law that required suppliers
contracting with the State in connection with public works
projects to provide products whose steel is American made.
The case therefore upheld the kind of discriminatory government procurement provision to which the EC strongly objects."s
Of course, eliminating such "buy America" laws and other
forms of state procurement preference laws would not in itself
ensure that state procurement laws contained all the procedural protections set forth in the GATT Procurement Code.
However, if the avenue were open for the removal of these
provisions through the courts, the U.S. negotiators might have
had a partial answer to the EC's major concerns regarding
state procurement laws.
Nevertheless, the Trojan court found Pennsylvania's "Buy
America" preference permissible under the "market participant" exception to the federal commerce clause power."9 The
court held that because the State acted as a market partici-

"' 916 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, _ U.S.
(1991).

, 111 S.Ct. 2814

3 See SERVICES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
REPORT ON UNITED STATES TRADE BARRIERS AND UNFAIR PRACTICES 1991:

PROBLEMS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH THE U.S. 53-57 (1991) (listing state

procurement preferences).
" See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984);
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Reeves, Inc. v Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Co.,
426 U.S. 794 (1976).
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pant rather than a market regulator, it was "not subject to the
restraints of the Commerce Clause" that otherwise would
prohibit "discriminatory state regulations designed to promote
local enterprise at the expense of that from other states or
from foreign countries." 0 Instead, the State could discriminate against foreign steel to the same extent that a similarly
situated private purchaser could specify the source of steel
used in any goods provided by its supplier.4
With regard to the foreign affairs powers of the federal
government, the court acknowledged that "any state law that
involves the state in the actual conduct of foreign affairs is
unconstitutional." 2 In this case, however, the court found
that the State would not be involved in the actual conduct of
foreign affairs because the statute applied to all foreign steel,
regardless of the country of origin, and as a result it did not
provide opportunities for State officials to tie their decisions to
particular foreign policy concerns regarding individual
countries.4" The Pennsylvania law therefore did not unconstitutionally interfere with the federal government's foreign
affairs powers.44
The Trojan case was not the first decision passing on the
constitutionality of 'Buy America" laws.4
Earlier state
supreme court decisions had split, with the California court in
1969 finding a "Buy America" provision unconstitutional,"
and the New Jersey court in 1977 upholding such a provision.47 Trojan, however, can be said to mark a trend indicat916 F.2d at 909-10.
41 Id. at 911.
40

Id. at 913.
In so holding, the court distinguished Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968). See discussion of this case, infra notes 49-52 and accompanying
text.
42

4

1Id.

44 In addition, the court found that striking down the statute would in

fact contravene an established U.S. trade policy not to unilaterally remove
procurement preferences, but rather to bargain them away for reciprocal
commitments from trading partners. 916 F.2d at 913-14.
4'Trojan was, however, the first federal court decision on this issue.
Although the Supreme Court noted the issue in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 437 n.9, the issue was not before the Court, so the Court did not
decide it.
46 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
47 K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
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ing that state procurement preference laws are not likely to be
eliminated by action in the courts pursuant to the "dormant"
powers of the federal government under the commerce clause
or the foreign affairs powers.
The only case finding a "Buy America" law unconstitutional, the California court's 1969 decision in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs,48 rested upon a reading of the
Supreme Court's discussion of the foreign affairs powers in
Zschernig v. Miller.4
Quoting Zschernig, the Bethlehem
court struck down the California "Buy America" law because
the act "had a direct impact upon foreign relations, and may
well adversely affect the power of the central government to
deal with those problems."5 0
Subsequent cases interpreting Zschernig have relied less on
this "direct impact" analysis, instead focusing on the fact that
the Zschernig Court was primarily concerned that the application of the law in question in that case would involve judicial
and administrative officials in evaluating and making judgments based on their views of foreign policy concerns regarding particular countries. 5 ' Indeed, the Trojan Court distinguished Zschernig on this basis, noting that because the
Pennsylvania law applied without discretion to all foreign
countries, it would not involve state officials in making
discretionary foreign policy judgments regarding the application of the law to particularcountries.52 Other recent decisions have followed this reading of Zschernig as well.5" It

80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
50 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)).
The Bethlehem Court did not rely on any commerce clause analysis. Note
that the "market participant" doctrine was expounded in Reeves v. Stake in
1976, seven years after the Bethlehem decision.
51 Zschernig struck down an Oregon statute that prohibited a nonresident to inherit from an Oregon resident if the nonresident's government did
not accord inheritance rights meeting certain standards. The Supreme
Court found that the enforcement of this statute in the Oregon courts had
essentially depended on the courts' foreign policy attitudes in connection
with the cold war. 389 U.S. at 427.
2 916 F.2d at 913.
"' See Bd. of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (1989) (upholding city ordinances requiring a city employee pension fund to divest of its
holdings in companies doing business in South Africa); K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774
48

4'
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therefore seems unlikely that a court will invoke the federal
government's foreign affairs powers as a basis to strike down
a state procurement preference law unless the administration
of the law would involve state officials in discretionary foreign
policy judgments regarding particular countries.54
Nor is a commerce clause challenge likely to succeed in the
future. The existence of four Supreme Court cases upholding
the market participant exception suggests that the exception
is firmly in place.55 Although one Third Circuit judge has
expressed the view that the Supreme Court's decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth." removes
the theoretical foundation for the market participant exception,57 that view has not flourished. The market participant
exception, therefore, will probably continue to apply in future
cases regarding the constitutionality of state procurement
preference laws. There seems little doubt that a state
procuring materials and supplies is acting as a market
participant.5"
Thus, U.S. trade negotiators are unable to tell their EC
counterparts that greater openness in state procurement will
come through action in the courts, and hence that there is no
need to bind the states. As a result, the United States must
face squarely the question of whether to bring the states under
the obligations of the Code, seek their voluntary commitment
to the Code, or risk stalemate with the EC in the Procurement
Code negotiations.

(1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978) (upholding state "buy

America" law).
" For example, a state procurement preference law that based the
applicability of the preference on a judgment by state officials as to whether
the home country of the bidder followed "unfair" trade policies arguably
would not pass constitutional muster.
See supra note 39.
469 U.S. 528 (1984).
6 See Swinn Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 26062 (3d Cir. 1986) (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
68 Trojan, 916 F.2d at 909-11.
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4. CODE COMPATIBILITY OF STATE LAWS

4.1. Overview
For the states to bring their procurement procedures into
line with the Procurement Code, either voluntarily or at the
command of the federal government, there is much work to be
done. The problem is not just that a majority of states have
either a "Buy America" provision similar to the one reviewed
by the Trojan court or a "Buy In-State" provision. In addition
to such preference provisions, a majority of states fall significantly short of at least one of the essential procedural requirements provided in the Code. Although the failure to meet
basic procedural requirements of the Code- as opposed to
expressly discriminating against out-of-state or foreign
products or suppliers- does not necessarily mean that a state
treats foreign producers unfairly, U.S. trading partners could
reasonably claim that falling substantially short of the mark
on one or more major Code requirements could allow discrimination against, or at least disadvantage, foreign producers.
In many cases, the GATT Procurement Code states its
procedural requirements with a higher degree of detail and
specificity than the procurement laws of the states." Argu, The Procurement laws of many states are patterned after the
American Bar Association's Model Code, which was approved in 1979. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS VI (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter A.B.A MODEL

PROCUREMENT CODE]. For discussions of the A.B.A. Model Procurement
Code, see Louis F. Del Duca et al., State and Local Government Procurement: Developments in Legislationand Litigation, 18 URB. LAW. 301 (1986);
Patrick J. Falvey et al., ABA Proposes Legislative Adoption of a Model
Procurement Code for State and Local Governments, 11 URB. LAW. 481
(1979).
The A.B.A. Model Procurement Code is less detailed than the GATT
Procurement Code in some areas. For example, regarding the preparation
of specifications, the Procurement Code requires, among other things, that
technical specifications shall be "in terms of performance rather than
design," and "shall be based on international standards, national technical
regulations, or recognized national standards." It also requires that
specifications make no "requirement or reference to a particular trade mark
or name, patent, design or type." Procurement Code art. IV(2), (3).
The A.B.A. Model Procurement Code has no such requirements,
although the commentary to section 4-202 states that "[t]he major goals of
the drafters [of specifications] should be to encourage competition and
prevent favoritism." Arguably, these are the goals that the more detailed
GATT Code provisions aim to serve. Thus, the two codes concur in broad
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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ably, a state law that in broad terms meets the Code's
concerns while failing to require all the specifics is not as
serious a departure from the Code as a state law that either
fails to address a basic procedural requirement even in broad
terms or, worse, imposes a procedure contradictory to a basic
Code procedure. Undoubtedly a search for petty differences
between Code and state procedures would reveal that every
state is in violation of the Code. 0 However, a more fruitful
endeavor is to attempt to identify the areas in which the states
significantly depart from the Code, in order to determine the
most important changes that would be required to bring the
states into conformity with the Code.
This article surveys state compliance with the following
basic Code requirements: (1) nondiscrimination/award of the
contract; (2) preparation of specifications; (3) pre-qualification
of suppliers/use of bidder's lists; (4) notice; (5) requirement of
competitive bidding procedures/exceptions; and (6) bid protest
procedures."' Although this is not a complete list of the
principal procedural requirements under the Code, it is a good
sampling, the discussion of which gives a reasonable indication
of the kinds of adjustments in state laws that would be
required to bring them into compatibility with the Code. Also,
the laws are examined only from the point of view of current
Code requirements, not pending proposals for reform. Thus,
for example, no examination is made of state laws regarding
contracts for the provision of services or public works. 2
terms, except the GATT Code is more specific.
" For example, with regard to the timing of the issuance of notice of a
procurement opportunity-a requirement which below is argued not to be
petty-only two states meet the Code's requirement of 40 days. See infra
notes 102-03 and accompanying text. These two states, Nevada and
Pennsylvania, violate other Code requirements. Pennsylvania has a "Buy
America" law, and Nevada has a tie bid preference for in-state producers.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text. Below it is argued that neither
of these Code infractions is petty.
61 The survey is based on the states' published statutes and administrative regulations; it does not include practices or guidelines not found in
these sources.
62 Many states have separate laws for the procurement of goods and the
procurement of construction and engineering services. Indeed, the A.B.A.
Model Procurement Code takes this approach. See generally, A.B.A. MODEL
PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 59. In many states, these public works
procurement statutes contain "Buy America" or "Buy In-State" preferences
not found in the sections of their statutes applicable to procurement of
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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4.2. Code Compatibility
4.2.1. Nondiscrimination/Award of the Contract
Article II of the Code requires that a signatory accord to
the products and suppliers of other signatories "treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to domestic products and
suppliers." 3 It also prohibits discrimination against locally
established suppliers based on the country of origin of the
goods supplied or the degree of foreign affiliation of the
supplier."
These requirements have the effect of prohibiting "Buy
America" laws. By preferring an American made product or
supplier over a product or supplier from another Code signatory, a state would be according the foreign product or supplier
less favorable treatment than the domestic supplier.
The following states have statutes that encourage or
require procurement officials to prefer U.S. goods or suppliers
in the award of purchasing contracts covered by the Code:
STATE

CODE SECTION

PROVISION

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann.
§ 50-5-81

It is unlawful for the state
to purchase beef not raised
in the United States.

Hawaii

Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 103-24

In the purchase of
materials or supplies, preference shall be given to
American products, materials and supplies.

goods. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 39-3-1 (1975) and 39-3-4(a) (Supp. 1990)
(providing "Buy America" preference for construction contracts). Alabama
has no "Buy America" provision in the section of its statute relating to the
procurement of goods. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-241 (1984)
(providing five percent preference for in-state bidders and materials for
construction contracts).
,3 Procurement Code art. II(1)(a).
64 Procurement Code art. 11(2).
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Iowa Code Ann.

§ 18.3
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The life cycle costs of
American motor vehicles
is reduced by 5 percent for
purposes of comparing costs
with foreign vehicles.

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 75-3739(e)

"The director of purchases
may reject a contract or
purchase on the basis that
a product is manufactured
or assembled outside the
United States."

Louisiana

La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 39, § 361

Purchasing authority may
provide that no foreign
vehicles or aircraft shall be
purchased.

Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 7, § 22
(17); Mass. Regs.
Code tit. 802,
§ 2:01(16)

Preference in the purchase
of supplies and materials,
other considerations being
equal, shall be given in
favor of supplies and materials manufactured and sold
within the United States.

Minnesota

Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 16B.101

"To the extent possible,
specifications must be written so as to permit the
public agency to purchase
materials manufactured in
the United States."

Mississippi

Miss. Code Ann.
§ 31-7-13

"Specifications... shall be
written so as not to exclude
comparable equipment of
domestic manufacture."

Missouri

Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 34.353

Contracts for the purchase
of commodities "shall contain a provision that any
manufactured
goods or

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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commodities used or supplied in the performance of
that contract .

.

. shall be

manufactured, assembled,
or produced in the United
States."
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-1-21.1

Only trucks and cars
assembled in North America may be purchased.

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 125.11

The procuring agency "shall
first reject bids that offer
goods that have not been or
that will not be produced or
mined in the United
States."

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 74, § 85.5

General preference for the
purchase of American
goods.

Pennsylvania Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 71, § 639(c)

"[Tihe department shall, in
all cases, give preference to
goods of American production or manufacture."

South Dakota S.D. Codified
Laws Ann.
§ 5-19-1.1

No foreign-raised meat
products may be
purchased.

Texas

"[Slupplies, materials,
equipment, or agricultural
products produced or grown
in other states of the
United States of America
shall be given preference
over foreign products, the
cost to the state and the
quality being equal."

Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art.
601b, § 3.28(b)
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Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 16.72(c)
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"To the extent possible, the
department shall write
specifications so as to permit the purchase of materials manufactured in the
United States."

In addition to these "Buy America" provisions, 37 states
have "Buy In-State" procurement preferences. These preferences take one of three forms: (1) those that prefer in-state
bidders or products when all else is equal (a "tie-bid" preference); (2) those that prefer an in-state bidder, or a bid offering
to use in-state products, even when that bid is higher by a
certain percentage than an out-of-state bidder or a bid using
out-of-state products (a "percentage" preference); and (3) those
that prefer an in-state bidder over a bidder from another state
that provides a preference to its in-state bidders (a "reciprocal"
preference).
Alabama provides an example of a tie-bid preference for instate bidders and products:
The purchasing agent in the purchase of or contract for
personal property or contractual services shall give
preference, provided there is no sacrifice or loss in price
or quality, to commodities produced in Alabama or sold
by Alabama persons, firms, or corporations.6 5
Oklahoma provides an example of a 5% preference for instate products:
The state ...

shall prefer, in all purchases, supplies,

materials and provisions produced, manufactured or
grown in this state; provided that such preference shall
not be for articles of inferior quality to those offered
from outside the state, but a differential of not to
exceed five percent (5%) may be allowed in the cost of
Oklahoma
materials, supplies, and provisions of equal
66
quality.
Florida provides an example of a reciprocal preference:

65

ALA. CODE § 41-16-27(c) (1990).
§ 85.32 (1989).

66 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
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When . . . the lowest responsible bidder is a bidder
whose principal place of business is in a state . . .
which grants a preference . . . to a person whose,

principal place of business is in such state, [then] this
state may award a preference [in an equal amount] to
the lowest responsible bidder having a principal place
of business in this state.6"
In-state preferences contravene the GATT Code by denying
foreign suppliers and products national treatment. An in-state
preference, however, might not treat a foreign supplier or
product less favorably than a domestic one in every case. For
example, an in-state preference directed at suppliers but not
products would work in favor of foreign-made products
supplied by an in-state supplier. Also, a preference for in-state
products would work to the advantage of a subsidiary of a
foreign producer manufacturing the products in the state.
Moreover, in-state preferences disadvantage U.S. suppliers and
products from other states in the same way that they disadvantage foreign products and suppliers.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there would be many circumstances when in-state preferences would arbitrarily discriminate against foreign suppliers or products. Because in those
circumstances the in-state preference laws would treat a
foreign product or supplier less favorably than a similarly
situated domestic product or supplier, the laws would violate
the national treatment clause of the Code."
The denial of national treatment is a concern for all three
types of in-state preferences. In the case of a percentage
preference, the discrimination under the preference law is
obvious. In the case of a tie bid preference, the problem is not
that an in-state bidder will sometimes prevail over an out-ofstate bidder with an equal bid, but rather that the in-state
bidder will always prevail.6 "
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.084(1) (West 1991).
There is no indication in the Code's national treatment clause that
incidences of worse than national treatment are to be offset against
incidences of better than national treatment.
" Interestingly, the A.B.A. Model Procurement Code recommends tie-bid
preferences. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE MODEL PROCUREMENT
67

68

CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:

RECOMMENDED REGULATIONS

R3-202-15, comment a (1980) [hereinafter A.B.A. MODEL PROCUREMENT
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In the case of a reciprocal preference, the discrimination
against foreign products or suppliers is more complicated and
perhaps also less common. It depends upon whether the
reciprocal preference law in question applies the preference by
raising the bid of the out-of-state company to which the
preference is applied, or whether the preference lowers the bid
of the in-state company. In the former circumstance, a foreign
supplier would be disadvantaged only in the case where it was
operating through a subsidiary or branch that was located in
the state against which the preference was applied. A foreign
product (as opposed to supplier) would be disadvantaged only
in the case when the product was being offered by a supplier
in the state against which the reciprocal preference was
invoked.
When the preference lowers the bid of the in-state company, the same discrimination could occur regarding foreign
products or suppliers from the state against which the
preference is invoked. In addition, however, the preference
could disadvantage other foreign bidders or products as well.
Consider the following scenario that could occur under
Florida's reciprocal preference law:"
Suppose a supplier
from Germany has the low bid for a contract with the Florida
government. At a price one percent higher than the German
bid is a bid from a supplier located in Florida. Suppose the
Florida bidder is tied with a bidder from Georgia, and that
Georgia has a five percent preference for Georgia products and
suppliers.
Under this set of facts, the Florida law arguably commands
that the Florida bid be lowered by an amount equal to the
Georgia preference. Thus, the Florida bid would be reduced by
five percent, making it lower than the German bid which, but
for the application of the preference law, would have been the
lowest.
As a final point, even if the in-state preference laws would
not violate the Code's national treatment provision, they would
violate other provisions of the Code. In particular, Article

Under U.S. law, in contrast, tie bids are decided by
See 1B J. MCBRIDE ET AL., GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS:

CODE REGULATIONS].

drawing lots.

CYCLOPEDIC GUIDE TO LAW, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROCEDURE
(1991).
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.084(1) (West 1991).
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V(15)(f) of the Code provides the fundamental rule for the
competitive award of contracts:
[tihe entity shall make the award to the tenderer who
has been determined to be fully capable of undertaking
the contract and whose tender, whether for domestic or
foreign products, is either the lowest tender or the
tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria
set forth in the notices or tender documentation is
determined to be the most advantageous. 7
In the case of an in-state percentage or reciprocal preference,
the award of the contract does not comply with this rule of
award to the lowest bidder.
The following table sets forth the in-state percentage and
tie bid preference laws of the states.
PREFERENCE TYPE:
PERCENTAGE
TIE BID

STATE

CODE SECTION

Alabama

Ala. Code
§ 41-16-30

Alaska

Alaska Stat.
§ 36.30.324
-332

Arkansas

Ark. Code Ann. 5% bidder
§ 19-11-259

Connecticut

Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 4a-59

products

Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 287.082

products

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann.
§ 50-5-60

products

71

bidders &
products
5% bidder
3-7% products

Procurement Code art. V(15)(f).
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Haw. Rev. Stat. 3, 5, or 10%
Stat. §§ 103-43, products, soft43.5, 44
ware development firms

Idaho

Idaho Code
§ 67-5718

products

Illinois

Ill. Ann. Stat.

bidders &
products

ch. 127, para.
132.6(e)

5% bidder

Indiana

Ind. Code Ann.
§ 4-13.4-2-9

Iowa

Iowa Code Ann.
§ 18.6

bidders &
products

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 75-3740

bidders

Louisiana

La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 39.1595

Maine

Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 5,
§ 1825-B

7% products bidders
bidders &
products

Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws.
Ann. ch. 7, § 22
(17); Mass. Regs.
Code tit. 802,
§ 2:01(16)

products

Michigan

Mich. Stat. Ann.
§ 3.516(261)

products

Mississippi

Miss. Code Ann.
§ 31-7-15

products &
some bidders

Missouri

Mo. Ann. Stat.
§§ 34.060, 34.073

bidders &
products

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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Montana

Mont. Code Ann.
§ 18-1-102

Nevada

Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 333.300

New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 13-1-21

3-5% bidder
and products
bidders &
products
5% bidders
and products

North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 143-59

products

North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code
§ 48-02-10.2;
N.D. Admin. Code
§ 4-03-07-01(7)

bidders &
products

Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 125.11

Ohio products
preferred if
price is not
"excessive"

Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. Ann.
§ 85.32

5% products

Oregon

Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 279.021

products
food
products

Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 37-2-8
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann.
§ 11-35-1520(9)

2% bidders

products

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 5-23-13

bidders &
products

Tennessee

bidders

Tenn. Comp. R.
& Regs. ch.
0690-3-1-.08(5)

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

[Vol. 13:1

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

Texas

Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art.
601b, § 3.28

bidders &
products

Utah

Utah Admin.
R. 24-3-113(d)

bidders &
products

Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann.

Commissioner

tit. 29, § 903(c)

of general
services must
justify in
writing any
rejection of
in-state bid

Virginia

bidders &
products

Va. Code Ann.
§ 11-47

West Virginia W. Va. Code
§ 5A-3-37

up to 5%

bidders

Wisconsin

Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 16.75(1)(a)

"Preference"
to be given
to Wisconsin,
materials,
supplies,
equipment
and contractual services

Wyoming

Wyo. Stat.
§ 16-6-105

5% products
and bidders

The following is a sampling of states with reciprocal
preferences:

Florida

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 287.084

Idaho

Idaho Code § 67-2349

Illinois

Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 127, para. 132.6(e)
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Iowa

Iowa Code Ann. § 18.6

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3740(a)

Louisiana

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1595.1

Michigan

Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.516(268)(5)

Minnesota

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 16B.102

Mississippi

Miss. Code Ann. § 31-3-21

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 73-101.01

North Dakota N.D. Admin. Code § 4-03-07-01(7)
Oklahoma

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 103.1(3)

South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 5-19-3
Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-20.6(2)(a)

Virginia

Va. Code Ann. § 11-47(B)

4.2.2. Preparationof Specifications
The preparation of specifications plays a vital role in
government contracting. Specifications provide a basis for the
contracting agency to indicate what it wants from potential
bidders and to evaluate the bids it receives." In the drawing
of specifications, however, there is a tension between writing
contracting documents in sufficient detail to assure the
government's needs are met, and writing them too narrowly,
so as to unduly restrict competition."3 Moreover, there is a
risk that specifications could be drawn deliberately to favor a

72

See JOHN CIBINIC JR. & RALPH C. NASH JR., FORMATION OF GOVERN-

MENT CONTRACTS 337-39 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing purposes for specifica-

tions).
73

Id. at 338-39.
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particular product or supplier, even though other products or
suppliers could meet the government's needs."'
For this reason, the GATT Procurement Code contains
several requirements governing the preparation of specifications. For example, the Code states that specifications "shall
not be prepared, adopted or applied with a view to creating
obstacles to international trade nor have the effect of creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade." 5 The Code
also -requires that all specifications be based on performance
rather than design, and that no reference be made to specific
brand names unless there is no other way to define the
specification. In addition, specifications should be based on
international standards, and firms with a commercial interest
should not assist in the preparation of specifications."6 The
Code also generally prohibits procurement entities from
accepting advice in the preparation of specifications from firms
that might have a commercial interest in the procurement."
No state's law precisely mandates all of these requirements regarding the preparation of specifications. In particular, no state provides that specifications should be based on
international standards, and very few states indicate that
firms with a commercial interest in a procurement should not
assist in the preparation of specifications for it.
However, the laws of twenty states provide that specifications shall be drawn so as to "promote competition" and shall
"not be unduly restrictive," or words to that effect.78 Argu-

74

Id. See also COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PURCHASING 42-43 (3d ed. 1988) (discussing purpose of
specifications).
71 Procurement Code art. IV(1).
71 Procurement Code art. IV(2), (3).
7 Procurement Code art. IV(4).
78 See ALA. CODE § 41-16-67 (1982); ALASKA STAT.
§ 36.30.060(c) (1990); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2565 (1985); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-241(c) (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-104-205

(West 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-13.4-4-1 (West 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45A.080(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT. § 39.1655 (West
1989); MD. ANN. CODE § 13-205 (1986); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 2.5.501 (1991);

NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-154 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-164 (Michie 1991);
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 164(1)(b), (c) (McKinney 1989); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
§ 123:5-1-30 (1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 85.11 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-

2-38 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-2730 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 12-3-504 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-19 (1987).
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ably, these provisions come close to achieving the objectives of
the Code with respect to specifications. The states of greatest
concern, therefore, are the thirty that fail to include such
provisions. These states are:
California7 9
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Texas"0
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Of these thirty states that fail specifically to require that
specifications be drafted to promote competition and not be
unduly restrictive, several simply make no mention of how
specifications are to be prepared. Several more provide for a
governmental agency to prepare "standard" specifications, but
do not require them to promote competition."1 Five states,
however, encourage or require specifications that discriminate
against products manufactured outside the United States. 2
7, California requires specifications to be written so as not to
limit
competition to only one supplier. CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 22040 (West

Supp. 1991). While this provision will encourage competition, it leaves open
the possibility that specifications may be written to limit foreign competi-

tion, so long as more than one domestic producer's product could meet the
specifications.
"0Texas requires written justification for specifications drawn to
describe a product proprietary to one vendor. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.

art. 601b, § 3.09(b) (West Supp. 1991).

For a discussion of the Code

compatibility of a similar rule in California, see supra note 79.

,See, eg., W. VA. CODE § 5A-3-5 (1991).

These five are Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.101 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 31-7-13 (1990); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 164-a(3) (McKinney 1989); PA.
82
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In addition, two states expressly allow for specifications that
favor particular brand names or manufacturers."3
These
latter seven states most seriously run afoul of the Code's
requirements.
4.2.3. Prequalificationof Suppliers/Use of Bidders List
Many states provide for the advance preparation of lists
identifying bidders to whom notice of a procurement should be
sent. Many states also provide for the "prequalification" of
bidders. Although bidders lists and prequalification address
different purposes, they both may discourage competition in a
similar fashion.
Prequalification serves to determine that a given supplier
is reliable and capable of performing the contract.8 4 Commonly, governments will make a responsibility determination
before signing a contract with a supplier. Prequalification is
a determination that a supplier is responsible made in advance
of the solicitation of offers. United States law frowns on
prequalification because it limits competition to those suppliers who were qualified to bid on a contract before the notice of
the contract opportunity was even announced.8 5
Bidders lists, in contrast, usually are not directed at
determining which suppliers are "responsible" to perform a
contract. Instead, they set forth the suppliers that will receive
direct notification of a procurement opportunity.86 As a
general rule, the use of a bidders list will not unduly restrict

§ 639(c) (1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 16.72(c) (West 1986).
In New York, the favoritism for New York suppliers in the drafting of
specifications conflicts with a general requirement for specifications to
promote competition. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 164(1)(b) (McKinney 1989).
" These two are Maine and Virginia. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
STAT. ANN. tit. 71,

§ 1825-B-5 (West 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-49 (Michie 1989).
CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 72, at 206-07.
" See id. at 250 (prequalification has been held to be an undue
restriction on competition, and under U.S. law must be justified in writing).
See also Jackson, Prequalificationand Qualification:DiscouragementofNew
Competitors, 19 PUB. CONT. L.J. 702 (1990). The Council of State Governments recognizes the possibility for prequalification to limit competition
when it writes: "prequalification should not be used to establish or exercise
84

preferences for resident bidders." COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PURCHASING 54 (3d ed. 1988).
S See generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PURCHASING 53-55 (3d ed. 1988).
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competition provided that (1) public notice of a procurement
opportunity is given along with a solicitation to suppliers on
the bidders list, so that suppliers not on the list have a chance
to learn of and participate in the bidding, and (2) the procedures for getting placed on the bidders list are not unduly
restrictive. If these conditions are not met, the use of a
bidders list may have the same restrictive effect on competition as prequalification: only those suppliers preapproved or
preselected by the government to receive notice will receive a
fair opportunity to participate."'
a. Code Requirements
The Code allows for both prequalification and the use of
bidders lists.8 8
However, the Code prohibits using prequalification as a means to discriminate against foreign
suppliers.8" The Code dictates that the conditions for a firm
to qualify to bid on a contract shall be limited to only those
essential to ensure the firm's ability to fulfill the contract.9 0
Firms that request to be placed on the pre-qualified suppliers
list shall have their application promptly reviewed and a
decision given to them.9 ' Signatories using bidders lists are
required to publish the lists and the criteria met by the
suppliers on them.
b. State Compliance
A majority of states' laws make no mention of either formal
bidders lists or prequalifying bidders in advance of a solicitation. These states therefore might be in compliance with the
Code in these areas provided that they do not, in practice,
limit the ability of potential suppliers to participate in the
contracting process through restrictive preselection or prequal-

" The Council of State Governments recognizes the possibility for
bidders lists to be used to restrict competition when it writes, in the context
of discussing bidders lists, "[flostering competition is the basic duty of the
public purchasing professional." Id. at 55.
SProcurement Code art. V(2)(c), (d).
8
I1d.
"Procurement Code art. V(2)(b).
"Procurement Code art. V(2)(d), (7)(c).
SI Procurement Code art. V(7)(a).
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ification procedures.9"
Nine states, however, specifically
allow for bidders lists or prequalification without mandating
any of the protections required by the Code. Thus, these
states do not ensure that suppliers who are not prequalified or
who are not on the bidders lists have a fair opportunity to get
notice of a proposed procurement and compete for its award.
These nine states are:
Arizona

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-2541

Arkansas

Ark. Code Ann. § 19-11-236

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4a-57
Georgia

Ga. Code Ann. § 50-5-68

Indiana

Ind. Code Ann. § 4-13.4-6-2

Louisiana

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39:1602

New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-1-134
Utah

Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-27

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.19.1908

In addition to these nine states, another eight states
include requirements with respect to bidders lists or prequalification that contravene Code requirements, and thus create
the greatest danger of discrimination against foreign products
or suppliers. These eight states are:
Alaska

A person who desires to be on a bidders
list must present a valid Alaska business
license. Alaska Stat. Ann. § 36.30.50.

" The absence of any mention of bidders lists or prequalification, of
course, does not mean that these states in practice necessarily follow
solicitation and qualification procedures consistent with the Code.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2

1992]

BINDING THE STATES

Maine

Officials preparing bidders lists may limit
the number of out-of-state suppliers. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1825-B-4.

Massachusetts

General public notice is not required in
addition to solicitation of bids from firms
on bidders list. Mass. Regs. Code tit. 802,
§ 2:01(4).

Mississippi

Goods may be procured from preapproved sources at pre-approved prices,
without competitive bidding. Miss. Code
Ann. § 31-7-12.

North Dakota

Prequalification is required for bidding;
general public notice is not required in
addition to solicitation from firms on
prequalified bidders list. N.D. Admin.
Code §§ 4-03-02, 4-03-03.

Ohio

Notice of solicitation will be sent first to
Ohio businesses on bidders list, except
when it is determined to be in the state's
best interest to send notice to other bidders on the list. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 125.08.

Tennessee

General public notice is not required in
addition to solicitation of bids from firms
on the bidders list. Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 12-3-701, 702; § 12-3-203.

Virginia

Consideration of bids or proposals may be
limited to prequalified firms. Va. Code
Ann. § 11-46.
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Only eleven states' laws specify prequalification or bidders
lists requirements essentially in compliance with Code procedures."
4.2.4. Publicationof Notice
a. Code Requirements
An essential part of an open and competitive procurement
system is ensuring that notice of the proposed procurement
provides all interested bidders with a reasonable opportunity
to learn of the procurement opportunity and participate in the
bidding. Also, individual bidders who are given access to
information regarding a procurement opportunity before other
bidders will have the advantage of additional time to plan and
prepare their bid.
Because of these concerns, the Code's requirements with
respect to notice are perhaps more extensive than in any other
area. The Code requires that notice of a proposed procurement
be published in all cases except in a sole source procurement."5 The notice must indicate the nature and quantity of
the products to be supplied, any options for additional quantities, whether the procedure is open or selective, any delivery
date, the date and place for receiving tender documentation or
submitting an application for pre-qualification, the address of
the entity awarding the contract and providing information,
any economic or technical requirements, the amount of
payment for tender documentation, and whether the contract
is for a sale, lease, rental, or hire-purchase. 6

9

4 See ALA. CODE § 41-16-24 (1990); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE §§ 10302 and
10303 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-103-402 (1988); FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 13A-1.006 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 67-5730 (1989); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 44, §§ 1200.210, 1200.220 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45A.115 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1986); MONT. ADMIN. CODE § 2.5.401
(1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 601b, § 3.11(b) (West Supp. 1991); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Adm
7.05 (Sept. 1986).
" See Procurement Code art. V(4). By stating that published notice shall
state whether "open or selective tendering procedures" will be used, the
Code implies that notice must be published in the case of selective tendering
procedures as well as open procedures. Thus, even if a procuring entity

intends to limit procurement only to those suppliers invited to bid, the
entity still must publish notice. See also Procurement Code art. V(7)(c).
" Procurement Code art. V(4)(11).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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In addition to the content of the notice, the Code includes
requirements for the timing of notice. Providing sufficient
time to learn of and participate in bidding for a government
contract is important in encouraging new competition to enter
into a procurement market. Competitors not as familiar with
a given procurement system may require more time to find
their way through the procedures and prepare a responsive
bid. The GATT Procurement Code requires notice to be
published forty days before the date for the receipt of ten-ders.97
b. State Compliance
All but five states require some form of notice to be issued
in advance of a public procurement. Three of those without a
notice requirement, Iowa, New Hampshire, and Wyoming,
have very brief procurement statutes that include little detail
in general, although both Iowa and Wyoming indicate that
competitive sealed bidding is the preferred method of state
procurement." The other two," Oklahoma and Virginia, also

" Procurement Code art. V(11)(a). The importance of the length of the
notice period to fair competitive opportunities for foreign suppliers is
demonstrated by the fact that the signatories to the Code in the 1984-1986
Code renegotiations increased the general notice period from 30 to 40 days.
In explaining this change, the U.S. Commerce Department wrote:
Now suppliers have an additional 10 days to prepare and submit
bids from the time the original notice of proposed procurement is
published. This provision should benefit U.S. and foreign suppliers
who often learn of procurement opportunities through the mail and
thus have a relatively short time (compared with domestic suppliers
who can learn about procurements immediately) to put together a
responsive bid.
Commerce DepartmentPamphlet, supra note 9.
98 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 18.6 (West 1989); Wyo. Const. Art. 3

§ 31. In
these two states, it is possible that administrative practice provides for some
notice. In New Hampshire, however, the procurement statute indicates no
preference for sealed competitive bidding, suggesting merely that "[tihe
director of property and plant management may purchase materials and
supplies .... " N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1:15(1) (1988).
" In addition, Mississippi provides that competitive procurement
procedures including notice are optional. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-7-13
(1991). However, Mississippi has detailed requirements for notice, should
the procuring authority determine to use competitive procedures. Id.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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provide for competitive bidding procedures and may well
include a notice requirement in practice."
Although forty-five states require some form of notice, six
of these either allow or require the administrator to send the
notice only to prospective bidders on the pre-qualified bidders
list. These states do not require publication of the notice in a
newspaper or journal of public circulation, and do not require
posting of the notice in a public place. These six are not in
conformity with the Code requirement of notice publication for
all procurements except sole source procurements. 0 ' These
six states are:
Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3739(b)

Massachusetts Mass. Regs. Code tit. 802, § 2:01(4)
Montana

Mont. Admin. R. 2.5.503

North Dakota N.D. Admin. Code § 4-03-03-01
Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-3-203(b)

Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 903

With respect to the content of the notice, no state specifically requires the notice of procurement to include all of the
information stated in the Code. However, thirty statesl ° -require content that, while falling short of the precise Code
standards, is essentially sufficient to inform interested
companies of the proposed contract and how they may pursue
0
bidding on it.0'
The thirteen additional states that require
10 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 85.7 (West 1991); Va. Code
41 (1990).

Ann. § 11-

101 In addition, New Jersey states that invitations to bid "shall permit
such full and free competition as is... necessary to meet the requirements
of the using agency.... ." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(a) (West 1991).
1 1 Including Mississippi, which specifies the content that should be
included in the public notice, should the procuring authority determine to
use competitive procedures. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 31-7-13 (1991).

'0 3 See ALAsKA STAT. § 36-30.130 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2533

(1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-229(d) (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PUB.
CONT. CODE § 10311 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-103-202
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol13/iss1/2
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some form of notice do not specify any particular content
requirements for the notice. These thirteen states are:
Alabama

Ala. Code § 41-16-24

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann. § 50-5-67

Hawaii

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 103-26

Kansas

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-3739

Maine

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1825-D

Missouri

Mo. Stat. Ann. § 34.040

Nebraska

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81.161.01

North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-52
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 37-2-19(3)
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 11-35-1520(4)
Vermont

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 29, § 903(a)

Washington

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.19.1908

West Virginia W. Va. Code § 5A-3-10
(1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4a-57 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 29-6903 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.057 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 675718 (1989); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 44, § 1200.230(a) (1985); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 4-13.4-5-2(2) (1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1986); LA. STAT. ANN. § 39-1594-C (West 1989); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC.
CODE ANN. § 13-103 (1991); MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 802, § 2:01(17) (1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.07, subd. 3 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 31-713(c) (Michie 1991); MONT. ADMIN. R. § 2.5.503 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 333.300 (Michie 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(b), (c) (West 1991); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1-104 (Michie 1988); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9,
§ 250.3(b)(2)(i) (1983); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 4-03-03-01 (1988); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 125.07 (Anderson 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 639(f) (1990);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 5-23-10 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-203(b)
(Supp. 1991); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 601b, § 3.11(a) (West Supp.
1991); UTAH ADMIN. CODE § 24-3-104 (1990); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 16.75 (West
Supp. 1991).
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With regard to the timing of the notice, only two states,
Nevada"'and Pennsylvania,"'5 mandate that notice be given at least forty days in advance of the date for receipt of
tenders. All of the remaining states that specify a notice
requirement either require a shorter notice period,"~ do not
specify the notice period, or leave the timing to the discretion
of the officials in charge. 1 7
4.2.5. Requirement of Competitive Bidding Procedures:
Exceptions
a. Code Requirements
The Code recognizes three types of procurement procedures: open, selective, and single tendering (sole source).
Open procedures are those in which any interested supplier
may submit a tender. Selective procedures are those in which
only suppliers invited to submit tenders may participate in the
competition for the contract. Sole source procedures are those

'"NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 333.310 (Michie 1986).
'"PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 639(f) (1990).
106 ALASKA STAT. § 36-30.130 (1987); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2533
(1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-229(d) (1987); 1 COLO. CODE REGS. § 3202a.01 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4a-57 (West Supp. 1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. § 29-6904 (1983); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 13A-1.002(2)(a)
(1990); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 50-5-67 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 103-26 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5718 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127,
para. 132.4 (Smith-Hurd 1981); IND. CODE ANN. 4-13.4-5-10 (West 1991);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3739 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.080 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. STAT. ANN. § 39-1594-C (West 1991); MD. STATE
FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13-103(c) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16B-07,
subd. 3 (West 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-7-13 (1990); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 34.040 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. ADMIN. R. 2.5.503 (1990); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 18.161.01 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:34-12(b) (West 1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 142-52 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.07(c) (Anderson
1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2-19(3) (1990); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
601b, § 3.11(a) (West Supp. 1991); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 16.75 (2)(m)(b) (West
1986).
107 See ALA. CODE § 41-16-24 (1982); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10311
(West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1825-D (West 1985); MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 802, § 2:01(4) (1987); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.516(261) (1986);
N.Y. COMP. R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 250.3(b)(4) (1983); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 403-03 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1520 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. ADMIN.
R. 5-23-10 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-103(b) (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, § 903(a) (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.19.1908 (West 1983); W. VA.
CODE § 5A-3-10 (1990).
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in which a supplier is contacted individually to fulfill a
contract.1 0 8
The Code prefers the use of open procedures and selective
procedures provided that a maximum number of suppliers are
invited and those not on the pre-qualified vendors list have
adequate opportunity to become qualified."
Sole source
procurement is allowed only in narrow circumstances, such as
in emergencies that do not allow time for open and competitive
procedures or in the absence of responses to an open or
selective tender.1
The Code requires written justification
for the use of sole source procurement procedures.1
b. State Compliance
All but two states have a general preference for the use of
competitive sealed bidding procedures, or selective procedures
open to a broad list of suppliers. 2 The two states falling
,o8 Procurement Code art. V(1).
105 See Procurement Code art. V(4), (6), (16).

Procurement code art. V(16).
, Procurement Code art. V(17).
"

n Even though these procedures are preferred, many of the other
procedural defects discussed in this memorandum, such as limitations on
pre-qualification, short notice periods, and express "Buy America" or "Buy
In-State" preferences limit the extent to which the "competitive" procedures
will be truly competitive.
The requirements for competitive procedures can be found at:
ALA. CODE § 41-16-20 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 36.30.100 (1987); ARIz.
REV. STATE ANN. § 41-2533 (1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-228 (Michie
1987); CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10301 (West Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 24-103-201 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4a-57 (West Supp.
1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6903 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 287.057
(West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-5-67 (Michie 1990); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 103-22 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-5718 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127,
para. 132.5 (Smith-Hurd 1981); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 44, § 1200 (1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-13.5-5-1 (West 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 18.6 (West 1989);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-3739 (1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.080 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1594 (West 1989); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1825-B (1986); MD. STATE FIN. & PROC. CODE ANN. § 13102 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, § 22 (West 1990); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 3.516(216) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16B.07, subd. 3 (West 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 34.040 (Vernon Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-4-302
(1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 333.300 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:34-6 (West 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1-102 (Michie 1978); N.Y.
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short in this regard are Mississippi and New Hampshire.
Mississippi provides that all purchases of goods shall be made
from the state-approved source at the state-approved price,
unless the Department of Finance and Administration
determines that competitive procedures are appropriate." 3
New Hampshire's brief statute appears to provide for direct
purchases of goods by the director of plant and property
management." 4
Although forty-eight states prefer competitive bidding
procedures, six include significant exceptions that could limit
competition in a variety of situations. For example, Alabama
has a long list of situations in which competitive bidding is not
required."'
California allows sole source procurement of
automatic data processing equipment if the Director of General
Services determines that "the goods.., are the only goods...
which can meet the State's needs."" 6 Illinois states that
bidding is not required for the purchase of data processing
equipment."" Michigan allows derogations from competitive
procedures when it is "practicable" and "appropriate" to do
so."' New Jersey provides many exemptions from competitive bidding including, for example, for the lease of office
equipment or the purchase of "technical" equipment where
standardization or interchangeability is in the public interest."9 South Carolina has a general preference for competitive procedures but provides that information technology

STATE FIN. LAW § 174 (McKinney Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-52
(1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-44.4-05 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 125.07
(Anderson 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 85.7 (West 1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 639 (1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2-18 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-351510 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 5-23-8 (1988); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 12-3-202 (1987); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 601b, § 3.10
(West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-21 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
29, § 903 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-41 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.19.1906 (West 1983); W. VA. CODE § 5A-3-10 (1990); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 16.75 (West 1986); WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 31.
"3 MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-7-12 (1990).
114 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21:1:15 (1989).
"r ALA. CODE § 41-16-21 (1982).
"6 CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 12102 (West 1985).
117 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 132.6(a)(10) (Smith-Hurd 1981).
118 MICH. STAT. ANN. § 3.516(216) (1989).
1,9 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:34-9, 10 (West 1986).
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procurement may be "exempted from the requirements" of the
procurement law.120
Moreover, an additional ten states that allow sole source
procurements under Code-acceptable circumstances do not
require publication of a record justifying the sole source
procurement. These ten states are 1 ':
Iowa
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nevada

New York
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Texas
Wisconsin

The absence of a requirement for written justification
leaves open the possibility that these states will abuse sole
source procurements to prefer a favored supplier or product.
4.2.6. Bid Protest Procedures
a. Code Requirement
An important means to ensure fairness in government
procurements is to provide procedures for unsuccessful bidders
to challenge the award of a contract or any other aspect of the
procurement process. The importance of this issue to the
United States is demonstrated by the United States's request
for the establishment of a "local challenge" requirement under
the Code.'
Arguably, the Code already requires bid challenge procedures. The Code states, "[tihere shall also be procedures for
the hearing and reviewing of complaints arising in connection
with any phase of the procurement process, so as to ensure
120

S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1580 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
§ 18.6(2) (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN.

'2'See IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 16B.08, subds. 2, 8 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 34.100 (Vernon Supp.
1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-4-133 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 333.300
(Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 176 (McKinney 1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 639(x) (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-3-205 (1987); TEX. REV.

art. 601b, § 3.07 (West Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 16.75(2)(b) (West 1986).
' See Special Report, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 2, 1990 at 4 (setting
forth U.S. proposals for Procurement Code negotiations). See also 54 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA) 599 (Oct. 22, 1990) (discussing bid protests).
Civ. STAT. ANN.
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that, to the greatest extent possible, disputes under this
agreement will be equitably and expeditiously resolved
between the suppliers and the entities concerned."12 '
Regardless of whether the Code currently requires it or
might require it after the conclusion of the current negotiations, a bid protest mechanism is an important measure to
ensure the fairness and openness of a procurement system.
b. State Compliance
Twenty-eight states provide no bid protest procedure.
These include:"M
Connecticut
Delaware
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Kansas
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi

Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

12 Procurement Code art. VI(5). In addition, the Code provides for a
dispute resolution procedure through which a Code signatory government
may challenge another signatory's procurement contract awards or
procedures. The United States has invoked this dispute resolution
mechanism twice to challenge procurement awards by the government of
Norway. See 55 Fed. Reg. 19692 (1990) (discussing first case); Letter from
U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills to Representative John Conyers, Jr.,
April 26, 1991 (discussing second case), on file with Office of Public Affairs,
United States Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President,
Washington, D.C. 20506.
124 For the states with bid protest procedures, see ALA. CODE § 41-16-31
(1982); ALASKA STAT. §§ 560-699 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2611
(1985); ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-244 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-109-102 (1988); IDAHO CODE § 67-5729 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-13.48-1 (West 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 18.7 (West 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45A.285 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill -1986);LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-1671 (West
1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1825-B (1988); MD. CODE ANN. § 15-217
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 333.370 (Michie 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-1-173 (1990); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 4-03-15-01 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 37-2-52 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-4210 (Law. Co-op. 1986); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 12-3-214 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-45 (1990); VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-66 (1990).
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Pennsylvania
South Dakota
Texas
Vermont

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

5. CONCLUSION
This survey of state procurement laws has shown that most
states fail to comply with one or more essential Code procedures. Probably the worse area of transgression involves the
expressly discriminatory "Buy America" and "Buy In-State"
provisions. Thirty-nine states have one or the other or both
kinds of these preferences. These provisions may be the most
serious violations of Code standards because they expressly
require the kind of discrimination against foreign products and
suppliers that is a central concern of the Code.
The other procedural protections discussed in this article
aim at ensuring that procurement procedures do not indirectly
allow for discrimination against foreign products or suppliers,
where discrimination may not be express. The failure to meet
these procedural protections does not necessarily mean that a
state discriminates against foreign products or suppliers. It
does, however, leave open that possibility. Moreover, in many
instances, the states' procedural shortcomings are not merely
a failure to comply with a standard put forth in the Code, but
rather, they involve the use of procedures that directly
contravene the standards of the Code.
On the bright side, the overwhelming majority of states at
least clearly favor competitive bidding procedures and provide
for notice of a procurement opportunity, although in many
cases the notice requirement falls well short of the standards
prescribed by the Code. Optimistically, the states' adherence
to these basic principles of open contracting could indicate that
the states will be willing to make the adjustments in their
procedures that will be necessary to bring them into compliance with the Code. If so, the U.S. may find a way out of its
bind in the Procurement Code negotiations with the EC. An
agreement between the U.S. and E.C. in these negotiations is
essential to the expansion of government contracting opportunities for U.S. companies around the world.
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